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Post-Lecture Discussion
SPEAKER: DOUGLAS M. JOHNSTON
MODERATOR: REV. PATRICK D. GAFFNEY, C.S.C.
SPEECH: "RELIGION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION"
DATE: FEBRUARY 21, 1992
Rev. Gaffiney: [Professor, Department of Anthropology, University of
Notre Dame.]
Comments or questions from the floor?
Participant: You mentioned in Sri Lanka they accepted the reli-
gious help because they couldn't see any ulterior motive that the
outside body brought. But couldn't that always be a weakness or
isn't there a danger that the outside religious group will come in
and create a new conflict by destroying or trying to change the
culture? I am thinking of the Catholic Church going into Central
America, while they are helpful, if you will, to Indian groups. It
also may destroy some of the Indian culture, while bringing in the
Christian values. Down the road there is a conflict of which reli-
gion is it, the native Indian religion or the Catholic religion? Isn't
there a danger that there may be an ulterior motive that may lead
to heightened problems?
Dr. Johnston: That's a very insightful question.
The group to which I was referring with respect to Sri Lanka
is a group that is widely known; their only agenda is
peace-making. Period. They are not out trying to proselytize, influ-
ence, or do anything else. There are several groups that I could
name that fall into this category, where no one, but no one, ques-
tions their motives.
And when you speak of the Catholic Church as a possible
third-party intervener like that, what one finds is that where the
Catholic Church has been most useful 'in resolving conflict is
where its temporal power is called into play. The Pope has been
very active in this regard as in the Beagle Channel Islands dispute
between Argentina and Chile. There you had two Catholic coun-
tries that could appeal to the Church to provide a face-saving way
out of a situation which they had not been able to resolve and
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which seemed totally beyond the reach of an approach along the
lines that Roger Fisher was suggesting earlier.
So the Catholic Church doesn't really fit the mold of being
the dispassionate third-party who is only interested in peace. By
the same token, the mold that it has fit has been very useful in
the Philippines, in Poland, and in the Beagle Islands. There is a
moral authority there when all other authority breaks down that
can be appealed to and in which people believe. It usually takes
Catholic populations to make that work, however.
Participant: My question is: What about religion as a justification
for war?
Dr. Johnston: That's a very broad question and one that would take
a long time to respond to in a meaningful way.
As I mentioned in my comments, the contribution of religion
as a divisive influence in the affairs of man is widely known and
recognized. What we are attempting to do here is to turn a little
bit of that conventional wisdom on its head and examine ways in
which religion and spirituality can be used as an advantage in
these kinds of situations.
I don't think we are far enough along in our research to be
able to determine the entire range of causal relationships. I'm not
sure we ever will.
One of the things that religion typically introduces into the
equation-and this is a very difficult thing to get at through the
methodology that Roger Fisher was describing-is an attitude that
suggests, "My mind is made up, and it would be blasphemous for
me to think differently than I am because of my religious convic-
tions." That's a very, very difficult attitude to address.
So the best I think one can do, as I was suggesting, is to look
at the different religions and examine their theology in seeking a
rationale to support the practice of conflict resolution. I might tell
you, by the way, that each of the case studies that I described
have in common the fact that in almost every instance they are
Christian examples. Now, the peace-making mandate in Christiani-
ty is widely known; it has been implemented on any number of
occasions. We went to great lengths to look at other religious
experiences to find comparable kinds of case situations. An initial
precondition we felt had to be met was that the situation had to
be recent enough for most of the principal parties to still be liv-
ing so we could pass the test of good scholarship through "compre-
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hensive interview and the like. We also needed to have situations
that were resolved on a positive note so one could make the case
that there had been a positive contribution leading to a good
outcome. Unfortunately, after chasing about fourteen different
leads, none of them met these tests. It was very difficult.
Father Lewers: [William Lewers, Director of the Center for Civil and
Human Rights.]
I appreciate your comments since I've worked for some five
years for the Catholic Bishops of the United States and directed
their office in Washington on international policy.
But it seems to me that there is a caveat, a word of caution
needed because there can be an attempt by political forces or
ideological forces to manipulate religion, to manipulate churches,
to manipulate the religious community.
I can give you a rather egregious example of that. When the
.Reagan administration failed to convince the Catholic Bishops of
the United States of the correctness of its policy in Central Ameri-
can, primarily Nicaragua and El Salvador-because we were very
much in opposition to the policy of the Reagan Administration in
those two countries and in Central America in general-it then
tried what, in effect, was an end run. They advocated and imple-
mented the institution of diplomatic relations between the United
States and the Vatican for the very first time. That was not sought
by the Vatican. That was not sought by the Catholic Bishops of
the United States. That was sought by the Reagan Administration,
thinking that the Vatican would prove more malleable on the
questions of Nicaragua and El Salvador and the economy than the
Catholic Bishops of the United States. It was a sheer effort at ma-
nipulation.
So while I applaud your paper and the view of the positive
effect these organizations may have, there is, I think, a word of
caution and a caveat necessary.
Dr. Johnston: That is a very thoughtful comment and a helpful one,
and we are mindful of those possibilities.
In the Nicaraguan case, the person who was on the point was
John Paul Lederach from the United States. He, in fact, was doing
things that ran counter to the Reagan Administration's efforts.
The Administration did not want there to be a resolution of dif-
ferences between the East Coast Indians and the Sandanistas be-
cause that would enable the Sandanistas to focus solely on the
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Contras. One can only speculate as to the sources, but John Paul
was receiving kidnapping threats against his family. It was a very
dicey situation, and you're absolutely right about manipulation.
Let me give you an example of the kind of thing that I think
makes sense to acknowledge. When you speak with the former
ambassador from South Africa, Piet Koornhof, he will tell you
categorically that the only forum where the blacks and the whites
could come together in South Africa was the Church. That is
terribly important for us to recognize as a nation. If we want to
influence things in a positive way, then we should be aiding and
abetting that process, trying to facilitate those activities, but in
such a manner that it doesn't make the churches look like pawns.
Our ambassador can do a great deal on the scene by way of
where we place our emphasis and support. In many instances, our
motives are, in fact, rather altruistic. Sometimes they are just the
opposite. But it seems to me that in these situations where we're
really trying to provide good offices for a successful outcome, we
should recognize the potential and do what we can to exercise it.
Professor Walshe: [Peter Walshe, Professor, Department of Govern-
ment, University of Notre Dame.]
Just a brief comment. I think there might be some misunder-
standing of your term and then, if I may, ask a question. We
talked about a situation in Mozambique and the way in which the
governments had become leftist, a big debate about how messy it
was. And then you used the phrase "this spawned the RENAMO
movement." I think that's very misleading. RENAMO was not
spawned in an action against FRELIMO in Mozambican politics.
RENAMO has its roots in Rhodesia. It was generated from outside.
The RENAMO fighting structure was then later taken over by
South Africa and kept alive in the Transvaal. It was then funded
by extreme right-wing Portuguese groups who wanted to keep it
active. And it was then supported by right-wing groups in the
United States like the Heritage Foundation and right-wing church
groups.
So that phrase-you're obviously dealing with it in a short-
hand way in a short paper, but I think it's very misleading to say
that it spawned a reaction in Mozambique against the FRELIMO.
It was generated from abroad.




Professor Walshe: I would agree with Father Lewers that I think it's
possible for great powers to take over the latest movement and
manipulate it and produce a premature settlement of the dispute.
Conflict resolution at first sight seems admirable, of course, who
would be against it?
But if we're going to talk about religion and conflict resolu-
tion in a, broader sense, it's not simply the relatively short-term
history of bringing groups together. There is a second function of
religion, many perhaps, which is, in fact, to confront injustice.
And it's quite possible to argue that short-term solutions, which
cut short a process of working out justice, is, in the long run, a
disservice. So it's not a matter of just thinking about conflict reso-
lution in the short term, but whether religious movements, for
example in the Philippines or South Africa, could be supportive in
their thrust for justice in a way that creates tension and may pro-
long conflict-whether you should permit and encourage the State
Department and others to support populist movements to the
point where these justice issues are really faced rather than short
circuited.
Dr. Johnston: You have raised a terribly important question, and
that, too, has its down sides, for instance if you look at what liber-
ation theology has led to in certain situations in Latin America,
with priests taking up arms and promoting the kind of movement
toward change to which you have referred.
I see a need for balance. First of all, I think the Church has
to be non-violent in its quest for justice.
Professor Walshe: I think the Church's function in South Africa,
where it has supported a liberation movement, the Church's input
remained nonviolent. The Church was behind a whole series of
nonviolent tactics within South Africa. But there were many ele-
ments in the right-wing of the Church, even in the State Depart-
ment of the United States, who were polarized on this issue and
very opposed to the South African Council of Churches and the
South African Catholic Bishops, apparently keeping the conflict
alive. Because what the Church was doing in South Africa was
saying, "Look, we don't compromise on apartheid; it has to be
dismantled." If you wanted to get in prematurely at that point, it
would have compromised apartheid. And that's the issue I'm rais-
ing.
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Dr. Johnston: I understand your issue, but I don't think your as-
sumption necessarily follows. With the exception of the Dutch
Reformed Church, the role of the churches in South Africa was a
leading role; they were on the cutting edge in promoting the
abolition of apartheid. No question about it. It's interesting,
though-once that momentum was established and solidified with
the promulgation of the Rustenberg Declaration in November of
last year, in which apartheid was declared to be sin, Bishop Tutu
in particular, and the Church more generally, withdrew because
the political process had caught up with the Church.
The next thing that happened is that the Church started
coming under criticism for not doing enough to address the prob-
lem of violence. So what did they do? They got back into the
political mainstream and teamed up with the business community
in sponsoring a forum at which the parties could come together
to sign a declaration of nonviolence, something the government
had attempted to do itself without success. In South Africa, the
Church is looked to as being in the vanguard of promoting social
justice and change.
Let me give you another case in point, kind of an interesting
one. For many years, Kenya and Somalia engaged in border hostil-
ities because the northern third of Kenya was Muslim and identi-
fied with Somalia. After each of them achieved independence, it
was more than a little artificial that this territory was assigned to
Kenya rather than Somalia. So there was a secessionist movement
going on. It was in this context that the President of Somalia, Siad
Barre, visited Washington for some official meetings. In the course
of those meetings, he became involved in discussions with some
spiritually motivated lay persons associated with the National
Prayer Breakfast Movement. These lay persons had access to Presi-
dent Moi of Kenya on a personal basis. They asked each of these
leaders if they could possibly come together to resolve these hostil-
ities between their respective countries. Both replied that it would
be impossible-tantamount to political suicide. But the group
worked on both presidents. One is a Muslim, the other a Chris-
tian. They finally agreed to come together in a "spirit of fellow-
ship." They settled their differences and the hostilities ceased.
Now you look at the situation and say, well, how significant
was that? Sure, the hostilities ceased between Kenya and Somalia,
but if you look at what's happened since, Siad Barre has gone the
way of a despot, and Moi is under severe criticism for not moving
to a multiparty democracy. In that situation, I would submit that
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this sort of activity doesn't always equate to a "Damascus experi-
ence" in which the parties are suddenly transformed into wonder-
ful people from then on. It is rather a situation where they were
not going to come together under secular circumstances, but they
were able to do so on a spiritual basis.
I talked to Moi, and I asked him how significant that meeting
was. And he said, "Before the meeting, we had war; after the
meeting, no more war."
Professor Walshe: Why I'm concerned about this is because it seems
to me that the short-term processes you're talking about are a
legitimate function for conflict resolution. But underlying that is
going to be the role of the churches that's going to occur all over
the globe in many places, I think, in dealing with persistent eco-
nomic polarization. And then there is going to be long-run ten-
sion with the existing economic war and the policies of the I.M.F.
and the World Bank. That's a long-term thrust for justice where
the issues cannot be handled quite as easily.
Dr. Johnston: I understand. I take your point, too. Thank you.
Rev. Gaffney: It's only fair I call on Roger Fisher since he was re-
futed during the actual text.
Professor Fisher: [Roger Fisher, Williston Professor of Law, Harvard
Law School.]
In the literature, if you find something needs to be written,
someone will find a hole.
I think it's useful to distinguish between where all these dis-
putes or so many of them are between groups of different reli-
gions that none of them are about religion. They are not arguing
the Trinity. The religion is simply a marker to tell the teams
apart. When Harvard plays Yale, there's no dispute about the color
of the jerseys. The jerseys tell you which team you're on, and the
people divide along that line.
I do think one of the troubles with conflict resolution is this
suggestion that it may be too early to resolve the dispute. This
suggests a static solution. We want to pursue justice peacefully. We
want to pursue justice at minimum cost and needless bloodshed
and so on and so forth. It's an endless list. So it's a problem; it's
a process that goes on.
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But I'm wondering and I want to ask: Many of these religious
personalities, religious leaders well-motivated and so forth could
benefit in courses on simply technique, from the Catholic Church
in Rome, to the Quakers, to other groups. Do you think that
some good academic institutions could sponsor workshops for
religiously-motivated people that want to get with this business so
you can train people in everything we could offer as well as all
that they bring? I think there is a combination of talents that are
needed. But I find that even the Vatican during the Vietnam war
had a terrible problem with the apostolic delegate who had no
notion about this theory at all.
Dr. Johnston: Well, our goal is to strive toward that as one of our
objectives. The first group we are trying to influence is the For-
eign Service Institute. And the Director of the Foreign Service
Institute has told us that if we come up with something substan-
tial, they'll run with it. So we have that commitment up front.
That helps us in the foreign policy arena.
Again, that's sensitizing. You know, people understand how
deeply embedded that spiritual dimension is in much of the rest
of the world. And then the goal is to go after the religious side of
the equation. I don't know exactly where that's going to take us,
but our hope is to inform the religious communities in the same
way about these kinds of issues, and not just about the spiritual
aspects but also the techniques for how one goes about bringing
the parties together.
I think that Dayle Spencer was exactly right. There is enough
strife out there for all of us to spend our entire lives working the
problem, with plenty left over, so it really gets down to the level
of the individual. The more folks we have from the churches who
are empowered and informed along these lines, all to the good.
I probably presented this too simplistically, because the gentle-
man in the rear there has raised some very provocative and, I
think, farsighted' questions. But as I mentioned with respect to
Ghandi and others, they were seeking social change, but on a
nonviolent basis. And that is what the churches did in the recent
East German revolution, the same kind of thing. They helped
promote the agenda, they provided cover for the resistance move-
ment, and church leaders and members actually provided the
leadership for the local councils that governed the country for the
first three months after the overthrow.
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So I think there is a useful role, and Roger's distinction is
very important. It's not static. It's about process. It is dynamic and
continuous.
Participant: To study the Church as a united entity may be some-
what misleading in different conflict situations. It seems that, cer-
tainly from my experience in South Africa, that the reasons why
the Church became important may not be entirely always related
to the religious or theological mission of the Church, but may
have a lot to do with simply the availability of an institutional
structure, the availability of financial resources, the availability of
political and social space, moral legitimacy, and a nonviolent ap-
proach. And that really one needs to look in each conflict situa-
tion at how these different factors became important, not just to
treat it as perhaps a unified entity.
Dr. Johnston: I don't disagree with that at all. In fact, in every one
of these case-study situations, you find a unique blend of different
ingredients that were at work. Often, the one that seems to stand
out is the moral authority represented by a group or a church
that is trusted not to have ulterior motives, that can remain neu-
tral while bringing the parties together. And that seems to be the
principal ingredient. But the other factors that you spoke of, in
varying degrees do come into play.
One of the reasons, for example, that the Church was so
effective in bridging the gap between the resistance movement
and the government in East Germany was because it had played a
somewhat similar role under the Communist regime. To some
extent, those who played that role in some of the East European
countries were totally discredited once the revolution took place,
because they were perceived as having been in bed with those fel-
lows before.
There are so many nuances in this business that it is very
difficult to generalize or oversimplify. I do submit, though, that
there is tremendous potential out there for people who are ade-
quately informed and who have the commitment to make a .posi-
tive contribution where, in most instances, no contribution at all is
now being made.
Participant: Just from the discussion, it seems apparent that religion
and conflict resolution can play two roles. On the one hand, it
could be an aid to peaceful change, such as the examples you
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mentioned in Sri Lanka or South Africa; but on the other hand,
in liberation theology, it could be a way to pander to religion in
order to achieve certain political goals, to incite violence, or to
incite revolution, and in that way would perpetuate conflict rather
than resolve it.
How can we avoid one use of religion, but also use it as a
peaceful agent of change?
Dr. Johnston: Well, I'm not quite certain I know the answer. I
would repeat what I said earlier, that I think the Church's involve-
ment should be a nonviolent involvement. Look in Yugoslavia
right now, and you have priests on both sides of the line. You
have Croatian and Serbian priests with machine guns around their
necks. That's not what this is supposed to be about.
But I don't have a good answer, other than the fact that the
Pope has tried to place very tight constraints on liberation theol-
ogy as practiced in Latin America, for example.
And, you know, all too often, these things get down to what's
laid on a person's heart. They may be wearing priest's garb or
they may not. And you can't always control that.
But all I am suggesting here is that if you can accept nonvio-
lence as a prerequisite, then I think you can move forward at
promoting peaceful change that will lead to justice and a better
situation for the parties, that can bring the parties together in
some sort of an agreement.
Professor Walshe: A point of clarification. To associate liberation the-
ology with violence is a profound misunderstanding of liberation
theology. It's associated in most parts of the globe with nonviolent
process. That was certainly the case in South Africa.
Father Lewers: I would like to agree with Peter Walshe on that
point. Having lived and worked in Latin America, I do not know
of liberation theology being used to further the cause of violence.
Reference was made earlier to priests taking up arms in Latin
America. I only know of one, and that was Camillo Torez in Co-
lumbia back in the 1960s. It has not been a frequent occurrence.
Dr. Johnston: I am probably guilty of having maligned liberation
theology, but that is the supposed context for a number of situa-
tions at the grass-roots level where priests were out in front in
[Vol. 67:1443
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trying to promote change, but not necessarily on a nonviolent
basis.
Professor Walshe: If we had liberation theology in Yugoslavia, we
may not have had quite the extreme divisions of conflict that we
have now. We might have had a greater emphasis on nonviolent
processes.
Rev. Gqffey: This is a very important point, but we have room for
about two more questions, and hold to the new agenda items so
we can expand our frontiers.
Professor Walensteen: [Peter Wallensteen, Professor of Peace and
Conflict Research, Uppsala University.]
I was looking at your seven cases, and I thought they were a
rather mixed bag of very different things, I take. it that was delib-
erate to help you to answer some of the questions.
Clearly, in some cases, the church actors, religious actors have
been promoting nonviolent change between the parties in the
conflict and pushing in a certain direction. I mean, there is a
movement toward democracy in the Philippines and you have the
South African situation. That's one kind of conflict management
or conflict-handling technique you could say if you want to.
In a couple of cases, it is clearly a case of the churches actual-
ly being involved in the negotiations. The Sudan would be the
prime example of this, I guess. And in other cases, it is reconcilia-
tion after the war. That's quite different, and. I suppose, that's
deliberate.
Dr. Johnston: It is deliberate.
Professor Wallensteen: That's an interesting point. And I think that
helps you to answer the questions and that helps you with these
guys over here.
I was wondering, and you mentioned it yourself, that all of
these were basically Christian churches that were involved. You
mentioned you were trying to look for other cases. Does it mean
you did not find any Islamic cases, for instance? That surprised
me.
Dr. Johnston: We actually did not. In Islam you are much more
likely to find a Muslim mediating differences between fellow Mus-
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lims, than you are to find that sort of mediation taking place
between a Muslim and another religion. But although we searched
quite hard, we weren't even able to find a case that met the tests
of currency and successful resolution in the Islamic context. That
doesn't mean it's not out there. We just weren't able to find it.
Professor Johansen: [Robert Johansen, Professor, Department of
Government, University of Notre Dame.]
I was just curious about whether you've looked very much at a
quite different role that religion plays. These examples draw
heavily on a kind of third-party or mediating role by religious
groups or individuals in intergovernmental conflict. But religion
obviously plays a strong role also in either sanctioning or con-
straining, a willingness to use force on the part of parishioners or
the mass public in any society. And I'm wondering if your study is
looking at that at all?
Dr. Johnston: No, it's really not.In terms of the Church sanctioning
the use of arms by its parishioners, that's the other side of the
equation, the divisive side. We're trying to get at something that's
narrower, more specific, and positive.
Father Lewers: But it also constrains. It may constrain the use of
force even at that mass level.
Dr. Johnston: It may, indeed, and, in fact, I would submit that is
exactly what it did, for example, in the Philippines. Again, this was
the nonviolent approach to social change. The Church was out
front in keeping the process nonviolent. And the same thing hap-
pened in East Germany in Leipzig. There the government was
attempting to provoke them into violence, so that they could re-
act. But the churches held to their high ground. That, I think, is
one of the key elements: the capability, the leverage, the influence
of the Church to keep its parishioners nonviolent.
Rev. Gaffizey: We had a very instructive discussion.
Dr. Johnston: Thank you. It was very instructive to me.
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